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Abstract
We introduce the concept of logical full abstraction, generalising
the usual equational notion. We consider the language PCF and two
extensions with “parallel” operations. The main result is that, for
standard interpretations, logical full abstraction is equivalent to equa-
tional full abstraction together with universality; the proof involves
constructing enumeration operators. We also consider restrictions on
logical complexity and on the level of types.
1 Introduction
The study of denotational semantics seeks to provide mathematical descrip-
tions of programming languages by giving denotations of programs in terms
of previously understood mathematical structures. For example, if P is a
program that takes an input and produces an output, we might take its de-
notation to be a function from a set of input-values to a set of output-values.
The most widely-known approach to denotational semantics is that of tra-
ditional domain theory (see e.g., [14]), where the mathematical structures
involved are certain kinds of complete partial order (cpo). Other kinds of
mathematical structure have also been used successfully—for a selection of
different approaches see [1, 11, 13].
One of the principal aims of denotational semantics is to deepen our un-
derstanding of the logic of programming languages, and to provide concep-
tual and mathematical tools for reasoning about programs. A more specific
goal is to provide mathematical foundations for “program logics” of a kind
that could be used by ordinary programmers.
Denotational semantics can be used to establish relationships between a
programming language L and a logic J. By giving interpretations of both L
and J in some common mathematical structure M, we may be able to show
that if certain theorems are provable in the logic then certain properties of
programs hold—for example, that if the sentence P (3) = 5 is provable in J
then the program P (3) returns the answer 5. Such a result would show that
the logic J was indeed useful for proving certain facts about programs in L.
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In this kind of situation we have a way of directly understanding the
meaning of certain simple sentences of J (e.g., P (3) = 5) as statements
about computations in L. One is then prompted to ask whether one could
extend this to all sentences of the logic, and give an interpretation of J
purely in terms of the language L and its evaluation rules, without reference
to the structure M. For example, one might interpret quantifiers as ranging
over closed programs or terms of appropriate type. We might call this an
operational interpretation of J, in contrast to its denotational interpretation
in M. Besides the intrinsic interest of such an interpretation, it seems likely
that an operational interpretation would be more easily grasped by a non-
specialist than a denotational one.
Now, given a logic J with both an operational interpretation in terms
of L and a denotational interpretation in M, it is natural to ask whether
these “agree” in the sense that a sentence is true under one interpretation
if and only if it is true under the other. In this case, we will say that the
interpretation of L inM is logically fully abstract (or LFA) for J. A logically
fully abstract interpretation can be used to show that all sentences provable
in J express true facts about L under the operational interpretation. Note
that the familiar notion of (equational) full abstraction can be seen as a spe-
cial case of logical full abstraction: consider a logic J whose only assertions
are equations between terms of L, and whose operational interpretation is
“observational equivalence”.
Both the general concept and the name “logical full abstraction” are
due to the second author, though the idea was first worked out in the first
author’s Ph.D. thesis [11]. The idea as we have outlined it above is of course
extremely general, as it depends not only on L and J but also on the kinds of
operational and denotational interpretation we have in mind. The aim of the
present paper is to illustrate the basic idea by discussing one particular kind
of logical full abstraction, in the context of a simple logic for the prototypical
functional language PCF (see [14, 3]). We anticipate that the study of other
notions of logical full abstraction (whether for PCF or other languages) will
prove a very interesting area for further research.
The study of equational full abstraction commonly results in theories
of extensional objects, often of functions and data structures; these objects
have a natural mathematical structure, perhaps of order-theoretic, topo-
logical or algebraic character. The study here of logical full abstraction
results rather in intensional concerns, such as the study of definability and
so of computability. These distinctions harken back to Scott’s original ex-
plicit choice [16, 17] to investigate first extensional theories and only then
to consider questions of computability and of the relation with symbolic
computation. They also bring to mind the much more recent programme
of synthetic domain theory, where one tries to integrate the different ap-
proaches by working in, for example, the effective topos [7]. One should also
2
remark that intensional aspects may nonetheless play a role in the study of
equational full abstraction—see the study of games in [1, 8].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review
the definitions of the three versions of PCF that we will consider. We also
define the syntax of a program logic for these languages, and propose a
simple operational interpretation of this logic. In Section 3 we introduce
a very general notion of denotational interpretation for our languages, and
show how such an interpretation gives rise to a denotational interpretation of
the logic. We thus obtain a notion of logical full abstraction. In Section 4 we
prove the main result of the paper: a standard interpretation is LFA if and
only if it is both equationally fully abstract (EFA) and universal (meaning,
roughly, that every element of the model is definable). We end in Section 5
with a few further observations, and mention some open questions and some
avenues for future investigation. In particular, we consider restrictions on
logical complexity and on the level of types. For example, it follows from our
main theorem that a standard interpretation is LFA iff it is Π2-LFA (i.e.,
LFA for Π2-sentences). There are standard interpretations which are EFA,
but not Π1-LFA; it is an open question whether there are any interpretations
which are Π1-LFA but not Π2-LFA.
2 PCF and its Logic
PCF is an extension of the simply-typed λ-calculus with arithmetic operators
and general recursion. It can be regarded as a prototypical “sequential”
functional language; an understanding of PCF is thus an important step
towards an understanding of modern functional languages such as Haskell,
Miranda and ML. We begin by reviewing the syntax and evaluation rules
for PCF, and for two extensions, PCF+ and PCF++, obtained by adding
“parallel” operations. All three of these languages appear essentially in [14];
the formulations here differ in two inessential respects: one is the absence of
a Boolean type; the other is the use of a “parallel-or” constant rather than
a parallel conditional (for which see [18]).
The types of PCF are built up from a single ground type ι (the natural
numbers) using the right-associative binary type constructor →; we write
M :σ to mean “M is a term of type σ”. For each type σ we have a countably
infinite set of variables of type σ, ranged over by xσ, yσ, zσ, . . .; we also have
the following collection of constants:
0, 1, 2, . . . : ι, cond : ι → ι → ι → ι,
succ , pred : ι → ι, Yσ : (σ → σ) → σ.
The terms of PCF are built up from the variables and constants as usual
in the simply-typed λ-calculus:
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• if M :τ , then (λxσ.M) :σ → τ ;
• if M :σ → τ and N :σ, then (MN) :τ .
We frequently omit unnecessary parentheses, taking juxtaposition to be left-
associative; we also omit type superscripts on variables, when this causes
no ambiguity. We identify terms up to change of bound variables (α-
conversion); we write M [N1/xσ11 , . . . , Nn/x
σn
n ] for capture-avoiding simul-
taneous substitution (where N1 :σ1, . . . , Nn :σn).
An environment is a finite non-repetitive list xσ11 , . . . , x
σn
n of variables
(where n ≥ 0); the empty environment is written 〈〉. We say that M is a
term of type σ in environment Γ (and write Γ ` M :σ) if M :σ and all the
free variables of M occur in Γ. If xσ is a variable not in Γ, we write Γ, xσ
for the environment obtained by appending xσ to Γ.
The evaluation rules for PCF are given by defining a notion of reduction
(or rewriting) on closed terms. Specifically, we inductively define a binary
relation M → N on closed terms of the same type as follows (here n ranges
over the numerals 0, 1, 2, . . .):
• (λxσ.M)N → M [N/xσ];
• succ n → (n + 1), pred (n + 1) → n, pred 0 → 0, cond 0NP → N ,
cond (n + 1)NP → P , YσM → M(YσM);
• if M → M ′ then MN → M ′N ;
• if M → M ′ : ι then succ M → succ M ′, pred M → pred M ′,
cond MNP → cond M ′NP .
We think of → as a “one-step reduction relation”; we write →+ for its
transitive closure, and →∗ for its transitive reflexive closure. We say that a
term M : ι terminates if M →∗ n for some (necessarily unique) numeral n.
The language defined above is intuitively “sequential”—no two subterms
of a term are ever evaluated “in parallel”. We now introduce two extensions
of PCF including parallel operators. The language PCF+ is defined in the
same way as PCF except that we add an extra constant por : ι → ι → ι
(“parallel-or”), together with the reduction rules:
• por 0M → 0, por M0 → 0, por (m + 1)(n + 1) → 1;
• if M → M ′ : ι then por MN → por M ′N , por NM → por NM ′.
The syntax of PCF++ is defined in the same way as PCF+, except that we
add a further constant exists : (ι → ι) → ι (“existential quantification”). Its
reduction rules are those for PCF+ together with the following, writing Ωσ
for Yσ(λxσ.x):
• if Mn →+ 0 for some n, then exists M → 0;
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• if MΩι →+ m + 1, then exists M → 1.
We say that a one-step reduction M → M ′ is deterministic if whenever
M → M ′′ then M ′ = M ′′, and write M →d M ′ for this relationship. Note
that whereas for PCF every one-step reduction is deterministic, this is not
so for PCF+ and PCF++. Nevertheless, in all these languages evaluation
is deterministic: if M →∗ n and M →∗ n′ then n = n′. (In fact the more
general Church-Rosser Property holds, that if M →∗ Ni, for i = 1, 2, then
for some P , Ni →∗ P , for i = 1, 2).
We need some standard notions. Suppose L is one of the three languages
PCF, PCF+ or PCF++. A (one-place) term context C[ ] of L is a term of
L with zero or more holes, to be filled by a term of appropriate type. Two
terms M, M ′ :σ are observationally equivalent (and we write M ≈ M ′) if for
all term contexts C[ ] such that C[M ], C[M ′] are closed terms of type ι we
have C[M ] →∗ n iff C[M ′] →∗ n. The Context Lemma characterises this
equivalence. When M and M ′ are both closed, the lemma asserts that for
σ = σ1 → · · · → σh → ι, M ≈ M ′ iff for all closed terms N1 :σ1, . . . , Nh :σh
and numerals n, MN1 . . . Nh →∗ n iff M ′N1 . . . Nh →∗ n (a more general
version for open terms is easily derived). An operational proof of the Context
Lemma for PCF can be found in [12, 3] and similar proofs can be obtained
for PCF+ and PCF++; for these latter two languages it is also a consequence
of the facts that the usual cpo model is adequate and that all finite elements
are definable (see Section 3 below for a definition of adequacy). Operational
soundness (that is, if M →∗ N then M ≈ N) is a consequence of the Context
Lemma, together with the Church-Rosser Property.
Now that we have defined the languages of interest, we introduce the
syntax of a simple many-sorted program logic JL, much in the spirit of LCF
[5]. We believe that this is the kind of logic that would in principle be useful
for specifying and proving properties of programs. The sorts of JL are the
types of L; the expressions of sort σ in JL are precisely the terms of type σ
in L; and the logical variables of sort σ are just the term variables of type σ.
The syntax of the formulae of JL is as follows (here M,N are expressions
of the same type and P : ι):
φ ::= ⊥ | M = N | P ⇓ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 ⊃ φ2 | ∀xσ.φ1 | ∃xσ.φ1.
Note that JL is really a many-sorted first-order logic—we have a sepa-
rate ground sort for each type σ. We identify formulae up to change of
bound variables (α-conversion); we write φ[N1/xσ11 , . . . , Nn/x
σn
n ] for capture-
avoiding simultaneous substitution into formulae (where N1 :σ1, . . . , Nn :σn).
We will not be specific here about the axioms and inference rules of JL, how-
ever we essentially have in mind those of classical first-order logic.
Next we give a simple operational interpretation of JL; this gives us a
way of translating formulae into statements about computations in L. We
5
define a relation |=op φ (read “φ is operationally true”) on sentences (i.e.,
closed formulae) of JL as follows:
• |=op⊥ doesn’t hold;
• |=op (M = N) iff M ≈ N ;
• |=op (P ⇓) iff P terminates;
• |=op ϕ ∧ ψ iff |=op ϕ and |=op ψ;
• |=op ϕ ∨ ψ iff |=op ϕ or |=op ψ;
• |=op ϕ ⊃ ψ iff either 6|=op ϕ or |=op ψ;
• |=op ∀xσ.ϕ iff |=op ϕ[M/x] for all closed M :σ;
• |=op ∃xσ.ϕ iff |=op ϕ[M/x] for some closed M :σ.
We extend the relation |=op to all formulae as follows: if φ has free variables
among x1, . . . , xn, then |=op φ iff |=op φ[M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn] for all closed
expressions M1, . . . , Mn of appropriate types.
Notice that the notion of operational truth only requires concepts re-
lating to L itself—we are thus hopeful that this interpretation of the logic
would be readily understood by a non-specialist. However, we should point
out that operational interpretations of the formulae of JL other than the
“classical” one we have given are possible—for an alternative (arguably more
“computational”) interpretation see [11, Section 8.2].
3 Denotational Interpretations of PCF
We now introduce a very general notion of denotational interpretation for
our languages; it is convenient to use the language of category theory. Given
a category C with finite products, we interpret types of L by objects of C,
and terms of L by morphisms of C; we also need a semantic correlate of
termination. We therefore say that an interpretation I of L in C is given by
the following data:
• for each type σ an object I[[σ ]] of C (and for each environment
Γ = xσ11 , . . . , x
σn
n we write I[[ Γ ]] for I[[ σ1 ]]× · · · × I[[σn ]]);
• for each L-term M :σ in environment Γ a morphism I[[ Γ ` M ]] from
I[[ Γ ]] to I[[σ ]] (and if M is closed we write I[[M ]] for I[[ 〈〉 ` M ]]);
• a set T ⊂ Hom(1, I[[ ι ]]) (to be thought of as the set of “fully defined”
or “terminating” elements of I[[ ι ]]).
We impose two requirements. First, for any environment Γ = xσ11 , . . . , x
σn
n
we require that I[[ Γ ` xσii ]] : I[[ Γ ]] → I[[σi ]] be the evident projection, for
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1 ≤ i ≤ n. Second, we require that I be compositional in the following
sense: if Γ = xσ11 , . . . , x
σn
n , Γ ` M :τ and ∆ ` Ni :σi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
I[[∆ ` M [N1/x1, . . . , Nn/xn] ]] = I[[ Γ ` M ]]◦〈I[[∆ ` N1 ]], . . . , I[[∆ ` Nn ]]〉.
That is, tupling and composition in C corresponds to substitution in L.
This definition of interpretation for L is extremely weak (we do not
require C to be cartesian-closed, for instance), but it suffices for our purposes.
The most familiar concrete example is given by the category of cpos: all three
of our languages have a canonical interpretation in this category (see [14]).
The following concepts will play a significant role in the rest of the paper:
• I is sound if M → M ′ implies I[[ M ]] = I[[ M ′ ]];
• I is adequate if for all closed M : ι we have I[[M ]] = I[[n ]] iff M →∗ n;
• I is equationally fully abstract (EFA) if for all closed M,M ′ :σ we have
I[[M ]] = I[[M ′ ]] iff M ≈ M ′;
• I is atomically fully abstract (AFA) if it is EFA and for all closed M : ι
we have I[[ M ]] ∈ T iff M terminates;
• I is universal if every morphism f : 1 → I[[ σ ]] in C is definable
(meaning that there is a closed term M :σ such that I[[M ]] = f);
• I is standard if every morphism 1 → I[[ ι ]] is definable and the set T
of fully defined elements is {I[[n ]] | n is a numeral}.
Our definitions of equational full abstraction and universality are weak in
that they involve only closed terms—in our general setting it is not possible
to deduce the corresponding stronger facts for open terms (and arbitrary
morphisms). However, the two notions of full abstraction coincide if the
interpretation models β-conversion. Further, the two notions of universality
coincide if the interpretation is cartesian-closed (by which we mean that the
underlying category is cartesian closed, and that the higher-order types, λ-
abstraction and application are interpreted accordingly—see [10]; this prop-
erty implies that the interpretation models βη-conversion). It follows from
operational soundness that any EFA interpretation is sound. Note that
the usual interpretation in cpos is sound, adequate, standard and cartesian
closed; it is AFA for PCF+ and PCF++ but not EFA for PCF (see [14]).
Next we show how any interpretation I of L gives rise to a denota-
tional interpretation of JL. First some notation: For each type σ let Sσ be
Hom(1, I[[σ ]]); we may think of Sσ informally as the set of “elements” of
I[[ σ ]]. For each environment Γ we also let SΓ be Hom(1, I[[ Γ ]]). Then when-
ever Γ ` M :σ we have the set-theoretic function I[[ Γ ` M ]]◦ − : SΓ → Sσ.
For any formula φ with FV(φ) ⊆ Γ, we can now define a subset [[φ ]]Γ of
SΓ, corresponding intuitively to the set of tuples of elements for which the
predicate φ holds:
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• z ∈ [[ ⊥ ]]Γ never;
• z ∈ [[M = N ]]Γ iff I[[ Γ ` M ]] ◦ z = I[[ Γ ` N ]] ◦ z;
• z ∈ [[ P ⇓ ]]Γ iff I[[ Γ ` P ]] ◦ z ∈ T ;
• z ∈ [[φ ∧ ψ ]]Γ iff z ∈ [[ φ ]]Γ and z ∈ [[ψ ]]Γ;
• z ∈ [[ φ ∨ ψ ]]Γ iff z ∈ [[φ ]]Γ or z ∈ [[ ψ ]]Γ;
• z ∈ [[φ ⊃ ψ ]]Γ iff z 6∈ [[φ ]]Γ or z ∈ [[ψ ]]Γ;
• z ∈ [[∀xσ.φ ]]Γ iff 〈z, w〉 ∈ [[ φ ]]Γ,xσ for all w ∈ Sσ;
• z ∈ [[∃xσ.φ ]]Γ iff 〈z, w〉 ∈ [[φ ]]Γ,xσ for some w ∈ Sσ.
(in the last two cases, we assume—without loss of generality—that xσ does
not occur in Γ). We say that φ is denotationally true under the interpretation
I (and write |=I φ) if [[φ ]]Γ is the whole of SΓ, where Γ contains all the free
variables of φ. In particular, if φ is closed then |=I φ iff ∗ ∈ [[φ ]], where ∗ is
the unique element of S〈〉 and we write [[φ ]] for [[φ ]]〈〉.
Now that we have given both operational and denotational interpreta-
tions of JL, we have a natural notion of logical full abstraction:
Definition 1 An interpretation I of L is logically fully abstract (LFA) if
for all sentences φ of JL we have |=op φ iff |=I φ. More generally, if F is
a class of sentences of JL, we say I is LFA for F if for all φ ∈ F we have
|=op φ iff |=I φ.
Note that if an interpretation is LFA for a class of sentences, then it is
also LFA for the Boolean closure of that class. The next lemma shows that
such notions as adequacy1 and eq uational full abstraction can be recovered
as special instances of logical full abstraction.
Proposition 2 Let I be an interpretation of L. Then
(i) I is EFA (respectively AFA) iff it is LFA for all sentences of the form
M = N (respectively and P ⇓);
(ii) I is adequate iff it is LFA for all sentences of the form P = n;
(iii) Suppose that I is adequate. Then the definable elements of T are
those of the form I[[ n ]] iff I is LFA for all sentences of the form P ⇓.
Proof (i) is immediate. For (ii), it suffices to note that, by the Context
Lemma, P ≈ n iff P →∗ n for closed P : ι. For (iii), note that the condition
on T is equivalent to the statement that for all closed P : ι, |=I P ⇓ iff
|=I P = n for some n and also that the statement that I is LFA for all
sentences of the form P ⇓ holds is equivalent to the statement that for all
closed P : ι, |=I P ⇓ iff |=op P ⇓. But it is an easy consequence of adequacy
and the Context Lemma that for all closed P : ι, |=I P = n for some n iff
|=op P ⇓. 2
1This observation is due to Eugenio Moggi.
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The above lemma makes it clear that any EFA interpretation is adequate.
Further, such an interpretation is AFA iff the definable elements of T are
those of the form I[[ n ]]. In particular, a standard EFA interpretation is
AFA.
4 A characterization of LFA Interpretations
In this section we prove the following theorem characterizing LFA interpre-
tations. This is the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3 Let I be a standard interpretation of L. Then it is LFA for
JL iff it is both EFA and universal.
The standardness condition is a mild requirement that seems to hold
in all natural interpretations. (We will see below that this condition is in
fact necessary for the conclusion.) Our theorem can be used to show that
LFA interpretations exist, and that particular interpretations are LFA for
particular languages; it also guides us in the search for LFA interpretations.
The right-to-left implication in the theorem is fairly straightforward:
Lemma 4 Let M : σ be closed, z ∈ SΓ. Then 〈z, I[[ M ]]〉 ∈ [[ φ ]]Γ,xσ iff
z ∈ [[φ[M/x] ]]Γ.
Proof First note that if Γ, xσ ` N : τ then, by the requirements placed
on interpretations, I[[ Γ, xσ ` N ]] ◦ 〈z, I[[ M ]]〉 = I[[ Γ ` N [M/xσ] ]] ◦ z. The
proof of the lemma is now a routine induction on φ. 2
Proposition 5 Suppose I is a standard, EFA and universal interpretation
of L. Then it is LFA.
Proof We first show by induction that |=op φ iff |=I φ for all sentences φ
of JL. For the sentence ⊥ this is trivial. For sentences of the form M = N
or P ⇓ it is given by Proposition 2(i) and the fact that a standard EFA
interpretation is AFA. The cases for the connectives ∧,∨,⊃ are all trivial.
For sentences ∀xσ.φ, suppose first that |=I ∀xσ.φ. Then given any closed
M : σ we have 〈∗, I[[ M ]]〉 ∈ [[φ ]]xσ by definition of [[∀xσ.φ ]], hence, by
Lemma 4, ∗ ∈ [[ φ[M/x] ]] and so |=op φ[M/x] by the induction hypothesis.
Thus |=op ∀xσ.φ. Conversely, suppose |=op ∀xσ.φ. For any w ∈ Sσ, by
universality we have w = I[[ M ]] for some closed M : σ. But we have that
|=op φ[M/x], and so ∗ ∈ [[φ[M/x] ]] by the induction hypothesis. Hence by
Lemma 4 〈∗, w〉 ∈ [[φ ]]xσ . Thus [[φ ]]xσ = Sxσ , so |=I ∀xσ.φ. The argument
for ∃ is similar.
This completes the proof for sentences. To see that the result extends
to all formulae, just observe that if ∀~x.φ is the universal closure of φ then
|=op φ iff |=op ∀~x.φ, and |=I φ iff |=I ∀~x.φ. 2
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For the converse direction, we know from Proposition 2(i) that every LFA
interpretation is AFA. Thus it only remains to show that every standard LFA
interpretation is universal. To show this, we will for each type σ construct
a closed term Eσ : ι → σ (called an enumerator for type σ) such that for
all closed M : σ there exists n such that Eσn ≈ M . It is easy to see that
this suffices: we have |=op ∀xσ.∃yι.Eσy = x, and so if I is LFA then also
|=I ∀xσ.∃yι.Eσy = x. That is, for all x ∈ Sσ there exists y ∈ Sι such
that I[[ zι ` Eσzι ]] ◦ y = x. But I is standard so y = I[[N ]] say, hence
x = I[[ EσN ]]. Thus I is universal.
The fact that such enumerators exist is of some interest in its own right.
In the case of PCF++, suitable terms Eσ are already defined in [14], but
for PCF and PCF+ we need a different technique. The method we use is,
essentially, to construct a “simulator” for the relevant language within itself.
A very similar method has recently (and independently) been employed by
Abramsky et al. [1] to prove a definability result for an interpretation of
sequential PCF based on games; a similar result has been proved by Hyland
and Ong [8]. This yields an alternate semantic proof of the existence of
enumerators for PCF, analogous to that in [14] for PCF++. It is worth
remarking that there is no corresponding definability result for PCF+. It
may well be that there can be none; it is not at all clear, however, how
to even formulate a precise statement to that effect. In what follows, L
stands for either PCF or PCF+, and d−e is some effective Gödel-numbering
of L-terms as natural numbers.
Proposition 6 For each type σ there exists a closed term Eσ : ι → σ of L
such that EσdMe ≈ M for all closed terms M :σ of L.
We now fix σ = σ1 → · · · → σh → ι (h ≥ 0) and consider the con-
struction of Eσ; we will not be completely explicit as all we require is its
existence. The basic idea is that—given closed terms M :σ and Nj :σj , for
j = 1, . . . , h—the computation of EσdMeN1 . . . Nh will simulate the reduc-
tion of MN1 . . . Nh via the Gödel-numbering. The problem here is that we
do not have access to the Gödel-numbers of the Nj , but only to the terms
themselves; so, in fact, we symbolically reduce (via Gödel-numbers) the term
Mx1 . . . xh, where the xj are variables used to stand for the Nj . This results
in a further problem when, in the course of the symbolic reduction, we come
to a term of the form xjM1 . . . Ma. In this case we do not reduce, but rather
interpret, “passing” suitable simulations of M1, . . . , Ma to Nj .
For the idea to work, it turns out that we need variables not only of
the types σj , but also of all their subtypes. Let us define the relation ≺
between types to be the transitive relation generated from all instances of
γj ≺ (γ1 → · · · → γm → ι), for j = 1, . . . , m. Let τ1, . . . , τk be the (possibly
repetitive) enumeration of all types τ ≺ σ in breadth-first order (regarding
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σ as a binary tree). Notice that for each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k there exist pi ≤ qi
such that τi = τpi+1 → · · · → τqi → ι; we drop the subscripts on p and q
when they are clear from the context. Note also that τi = σi for 1 ≤ i ≤ h.
To simulate MN1 . . . Nh we may need arbitrarily many variables of each
type τi. We thus suppose that we have a countably infinite supply of vari-
ables xji : τi for each i, and that the mapping (i, j) 7→ dx
j
i e is recursive; we
say a term is σ-open if its free variables are among the xji . To “store” the
“values” of these variables we will use closed terms Fi : ι → τi, where Fi j
stores the value of xji . Since at any given stage only finitely many variables
will be in use, we need a way to introduce new variables. For each i we let
pushi be λv
τif ι→τijιλyτp+1p+1 . . . y
τq
q . cond j (vyp+1 . . . yq) (f(pred j)yp+1 . . . yq).
The effect of pushi V F is to store the value given by a closed term V in
the “register” x0i , and the previous value of x
j
i in the register x
j+1
i ; we have
pushi V F0 ≈ V and pushi V F (j + 1) ≈ Fj. To compensate for the use of
pushi, we also need an operation ↑i on terms of L that “bumps up” the
indices on the appropriate variables; the term N↑i is defined to be the term
obtained by the capture-avoiding simultaneous substitution of V ji for x
j
i for
every xji occurring freely in N . Clearly the mapping dNe 7→ dN↑ie is partial
recursive.
So, to define Eσ we construct an “ι-simulator” S : ρ (where ρ is the
type (ι → τ1) → · · · → (ι → τk) → ι → ι) such that if N : ι is a σ-open
term then SF1 . . . FkdNe simulates N , taking xji to stand for Fi j. Following
the idea outlined above, S will perform repeated one-step reductions, but
terms of the form xjiNp+1 . . . Nq are interpreted by passing simulations of
the arguments Np+1, . . . , Nq to Fi j : τi. For this, we need “τi-simulators”
Si of type ρi = (ι → τ1) → · · · → (ι → τk) → ι → τi; these are defined
from the ι-simulator S :ρ by the terms Θi :ρ → ρi given in Lemma 7, below.
Formally, S is obtained as a fixed-point of the term Φ : ρ → ρ given in
Lemma 8, below; its definition makes use of the Θi, and the terms R :ρ used
there and in Lemma 7 are to be thought of as “approximants” to S.
We need some special notation. First, for any vector ~F of terms F1, . . . , Fk
and term M we write M ~F for (. . . (MF1) . . . Fk). Second, for any such vector
we abbreviate F1, . . . , Fp, (pushp+1Vp+1Fp+1), . . . , (pushqVqFq), Fq+1, . . . , Fk
to pushp,q(Vp+1, . . . , Vq; ~F ), where 1 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ k. Third, for any term M
and 1 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ k we write M↑p,q for (. . . (M↑p+1) . . . ↑q). Finally, the no-
tation C[|N1|, . . . , |Na|] →+d C ′[|N ′1|, . . . , |N ′a′|] means that given PCF terms
U1, . . . , Ua such that Uj→∗Nj (1≤j≤a) there exist PCF terms U ′1, . . . , U ′a′
such that U ′j′ →∗ N ′j′ (1≤j′≤a′) and C[U1, . . . , Ua] →
+
d C
′[U ′1, . . . , U
′
a′ ]; no-
tice that the Uj and U ′j′ must be closed. (Here C[ , . . . , ] and C
′[ , . . . , ]
are “multi-place” contexts and →d is the deterministic one-step reduction
relation defined in Section 2.) This is useful because the call-by-name eval-
uation mechanism of L means that we cannot force subterms such as the
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U ′j′ to be evaluated when we would like. The consideration of deterministic
reduction (and hence of PCF terms) is only needed for Lemma 11 below.
Note that transitivity holds: if C[|N1|, . . . , |Na|] →+d C ′[|N ′1|, . . . , |N ′a′|] →
+
d
C ′′[|N ′′1 |, . . . , |N ′′a′′|] then C[|N1|, . . . , |Na|] →
+
d C
′′[|N ′′1 |, . . . , |N ′′a′′|].
Lemma 7 There exist closed L-terms Θi : ρ → ρi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that
for all σ-open N :τi and closed R :ρ, F1 : ι → τ1, . . . , Fk : ι → τk we have
ΘiR~F |dNe| →+d λy
τp+1
p+1 . . . y
τq
q . R pushp,q(yp+1, . . . , yq; ~F ) |d(N↑p,q)x0p+1 . . . x0qe| .
Proof Define Θi to be the term
λrρf ι→τ11 . . . f
ι→τk
k z
ιyτp+1p+1 . . . y
τq
q . r pushp,q(yp+1, . . . , yq; ~f)(Gz)
where G : ι → ι is a closed PCF term such that for any σ-open N : τi,
GdNe→+ d(N↑p,q)x0p+1 . . . x0qe. 2
We now consider the term Φ. Notice that the clauses given below cover
all syntactic shapes for terms of type ι. (The clause marked † applies only
to PCF+.)
Lemma 8 There exists a closed L-term Φ : ρ → ρ such that for all closed
terms R :ρ, F1 : ι → τ1, . . . , Fk : ι → τk we have
ΦR~F |dne| →+d n;
ΦR~F |dsucc Me| →+d succ (R~F |dMe|);
ΦR~F |dpred Me| →+d pred (R~F |dMe|);
ΦR~F |dcond LMNe| →+d cond (R~F |dLe|)(R~F |dMe|)(R~F |dNe|);
ΦR~F |dYτN1N2 . . . Nae| →+d R~F |dN1(YτN1)N2 . . . Nae| (a ≥ 2);
ΦR~F |d(λzτ .M)N1 . . . Nae| →+d R~F |dM [N1/z]N2 . . . Nae| (a ≥ 1);
† ΦR~F |dpor MNe| →+d por (R~F |dMe|)(R~F |dNe|);
ΦR~F |dxjiNp+1 . . . Nqe| →
+
d Fi j (Θp+1R~F |dNp+1e|) . . . (ΘqR~F |dNqe|).
Proof (Hint) We construct Φ via a “case split” with at most (k+7) cases.
The need for the consideration of PCF terms arises here, in order to ensure
deterministic reduction. 2
Note that terms of the forms succ M , pred M , cond LMN or por MN are
interpreted rather than symbolically reduced; this is needed to handle terms
such as succ xjiNp+1 . . . Nq where the operator must be interpreted since an
argument is. It is also worth noting that there is no way to interpret terms
such as YτN1N2 . . . Na or (λzτ .M)N1 . . . Na as the type τ there is arbitrary
and our method enables us to deal only with a finite number of given types
(here the τi).
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We now define S = YρΦ and Si = ΘiS, for i = 1, . . . , k. Note that:
S ~F |dne| →+d n;
S ~F |dsucc Me| →+d succ (S ~F |dMe|);
etc. and that:
Si ~F |dNe| →+d λy
τp+1
p+1 . . . y
τq
q . Spushp,q(yp+1, . . . , yq; ~F ) |d(N↑p,q)x0p+1 . . . x0qe| .
Finally, we take Eσ : ι → σ to be a closed term such that
EσdMe →+d λy
σ1
1 . . . y
σh
h . Spush0,h(y1, . . . , yh; ~Ω) |dMx
0
1 . . . x
0
he|
where ~Ω is Ωι→τ1 , . . . , Ωι→τk .
We need to prove that EσdMe ≈ M for all closed M :σ. By the Context
Lemma, it is enough to show that for all closed N1 :σ1, . . . , Nh :σh we have
EσdMeN1 . . . Nh →∗ n iff MN1 . . . Nh →∗ n. Clearly the following lemma
suffices:
Lemma 9 Suppose Fi j ≈ V ji : τi for each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i are
closed. Then for all σ-open N : ι and PCF terms U such that U →∗ dNe we
have S ~FU →∗ n iff N [V ji /x
j
i ] →∗ n.
The notation N [V ji /x
j
i ] denotes the term obtained from N by the simulta-
neous substitution of V ji for x
j
i , for every x
j
i occurring freely in N .
The lemma is proved by relating the possible reduction sequences of
N [V ji /x
j
i ] with those of its simulation S ~F dNe. Define “encoding” relations
 between terms of type ι, i between terms of type τi, for i = 1, . . . , k,
and  between terms of the same type as follows:
• if U →∗ dNe where U is a PCF term and N : ι is a σ-open term and
if Fij ≈ V ji : τi for each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i are closed, then
S ~FU  N [V ji /x
j
i ];
• if U →∗ dNe where U is a PCF term and N : τi is a σ-open term and
if Fij ≈ V ji : τi for each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i are closed, then





• if Ps  Qs or Ps i Qs (for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k) for 1 ≤ s ≤ r, then, for
any r-place context C[ , . . . , ], C[P1, . . . , Pr]  C[Q1, . . . , Qr].
Note that  is reflexive; note too that  is closed under substitution in the
sense that if P  Q and P ′  Q′ : τ then P [P ′/zτ ]  Q[Q′/zτ ]. We write
C[|dN1e|, . . . , |dNae|]  Q (where a ≥ 0), to mean that for any PCF terms
U1, . . . , Ua such that Uj →∗ dNje (j = 1, . . . , a) we have C[U1, . . . , Ua]  Q.
Lemma 9 is an immediate consequence of the next two lemmas.
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Lemma 10 If P : ι is closed, P  Q and Q →∗ n then P →∗ n
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the length l of a shortest
reduction sequence from Q to n. If this is 0, then either P is n or else P n,
and so, by the remarks after Lemma 8, P →+d n. For l > 0, fixing P and Q,
we first note that there is an r-place context C[ , . . . , ] (r ≥ 0) and there
are Ps and Qs (1 ≤ s ≤ r) such that Q = C[Q1, . . . , Qr], P = C[P1, . . . , Pr]
and for 1 ≤ s ≤ r, Ps  Qs or Ps i Qs, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
There are three main cases. In the first two C[ , . . . , ] has the form
[ ]C1[ , . . . , ] . . . Ct[ , . . . , ]—that is, there is a context hole in
“head position”; the third is where there is not. In the first case, the proof
proceeds either by reducing the length of the shortest reduction sequence
(and applying the induction hypothesis) or else by reducing to the third
case, with the same reduction sequence. The second case reduces to the
first, with the same reduction sequence. In the third case, the length is
always reduced.
So let us suppose there is indeed a context hole in head position. The
first case is where C[ ~Q] = Qs = Q and C[~P ] = Ps = P , for some 1 ≤ s ≤ r,
and P  Q (and t = 0). The second case is where C[ ~Q] = QsC1[ ~Q] . . . Ct[ ~Q]
and C[~P ] = PsC1[~P ] . . . Ct[~P ], for some 1 ≤ s ≤ r, and Ps i Qs, for some
1 ≤ i ≤ k (and t = q − p).
Let us now consider the first case. Here P = S ~FU and Q = N [V ji /x
j
i ]
where N : ι is σ-open, where Fij ≈ V ji :τi for each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i
are closed, and where U is a PCF term such that U →∗ dNe. The proof
now proceeds according to the form of N ; it is here that the workings of the
simulator are seen.
First, let us suppose N = por N1N2. Then, by the remarks after Lemma 8
we have S ~FU →+d por (S ~FU1)(S ~FU2), where U1 and U2 are PCF terms such
that U1 →∗ dN1e and U2 →∗ dN2e. Therefore S ~FU1  N1[V ji /x
j
i ] and simi-








i ] reduces to n in l steps,








i ] reduce to 0 or both re-
duce to a positive numeral. So we may apply the induction hypothesis and
obtain corresponding reductions of S ~FU1 and S ~FU2, and hence of S ~FU .
The cases where N has any of the forms succ N1, pred N1 or cond N1N2N3
are similar.
Next, let us suppose that N = (λzτ .M)N1 . . . Na. Then we have that




i ] = Q
′, say.
We can now apply the induction hypothesis, as there is a reduction of Q′
to n in l − 1 steps since we have the deterministic reduction Q →d Q′. The
case where N = YτN1N2 . . . Na is similar.
Finally, suppose N = xjiNp+1 . . . Nq. Here we have P = S ~FU →
+
d
Fi j (Sp+1 ~FUp+1) . . . (Sq ~FUq), where, for p < i′ ≤ q, Ui′ is a PCF term










i ]) = Q, and we are in the third case with the
same shortest reduction sequence. So, V ji (Sp+1 ~FUp+1) . . . (Sq ~FUq) →∗ n,
by induction, and then, as Fi j ≈ V ji , P →+ n.
In the second case, P = Si ~FU ~C[~P ] (abbreviating C1[ ], . . . , Ct[ ] to
~C[ ]) and Q = N [V ji /x
j
i ] ~C[ ~Q] where N:τi is σ-open, where Fij ≈ V
j
i :τi for
each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i are closed, and where U is a PCF term such
that U →∗ dNe. Then Si ~FU →+ λy
τp+1
p+1 . . . y
τq
q . Spushp,q(yp+1, . . . , yq; ~F )U
′
where U ′ is a PCF term such that U ′ →∗ d(N↑p,q)x0p+1 . . . x0qe. So we have
that Si ~FU ~C[~P ] →+ Spushp,q( ~C[~P ]; ~F )U ′.
Now, for i′ = 1, . . . , k, define W ji′ so that, for i
′ = p+1, . . . , q, W 0i′ is




i′ and, for all other i
′, W ji′ is V
j
i′ . Then we have that
Spushp,q( ~C[~P ]; ~F )U








i′ ] ~C[ ~Q], and
we have reduced to the first case, with the same reduction sequence.
Finally, we consider the third case, where no hole is in “head” position
in C[ , . . . , ] (which we abbreviate to C[ ]). The proof divides into
subcases according to the form of C[ ] We consider two of these; the others
are similar. The first is where C[ ] is porC1[ ]C2[ ]. Here we have
reductions to numerals in < l steps of one or both of C1[~(Q)], C2[~(Q)], as
in the previous case involving por , and we can again apply the induction
hypothesis. The second is where C[ ] is (λzτ .C ′[ ])C1[ ] . . . Ca[ ].
Here P = (λzτ .C ′[~P ])C1[~P ] . . . Ca[~P ] → (C ′[~P ][C1[~P ]/z])C2[~P ] . . . Ca[~P ] 
(C ′[ ~Q][C1[ ~Q]/z])C2[ ~Q] . . . Ca[ ~Q] = Q′, say (we use the closure of  under
substitution here). We may now apply the induction hypothesis, for, as
Q →d Q′, there is a reduction of Q′ to n in l − 1 steps. 2
Lemma 11 If P : ι is closed, P  Q and P →∗ n then Q →∗ n.
Proof By induction on the length of shortest reduction sequence from P
to n. If this is 0, the result is immediate. Otherwise, the cases are organised
as in the proof of Lemma 10(ii), but—unlike there—the length is always
reduced. Let us consider the first case, where P = S ~FU and Q = N [V ji /x
j
i ]
where N : ι is σ-open, where Fi j ≈ V ji :τi for each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i
are closed, and where U is a PCF term such that U →∗ dNe.
Let us first suppose N = por N1N2. Then S ~FU →+d por (S ~FU1)(S ~FU2),
where U1, U2 are PCF terms which reduce to dN1e and dN2e, respectively.
As the reduction from P to por (S ~FU1)(S ~FU2) is deterministic, the shortest
reduction from P to n must proceed via por (S ~FU1)(S ~FU2), and the proof
is now similar to that of Lemma 10. The cases where N has any of the forms
succN1, predN1 or cond N1N2N3 are similar.
Next, let us suppose that N = (λzτ .M)N1 . . . Na. Then we have that
S ~FU→+d S ~FU ′ where U ′ is a PCF term such that U ′→∗ dM [N1/z]N2 . . . Nae.




i ], and we may now apply the induction
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hypothesis as there is a shorter reduction sequence of S ~FU ′ to a numeral.
The case where N = YτN1N2 . . . Na is similar.
Finally, suppose N = xjiNp+1 . . . Nq. Here we have P = S ~FU →
+
d
Fi j (Sp+1 ~FUp+1) . . . (Sq ~FUq) = P ′, say, where, for p < i′ ≤ q, Ui′ is a PCF
term such that Ui′ →∗ Ni′ . But P ′Fi j (Np+1[V ji /x
j













i ]) →∗ n. But










i ]) = Q we have that
Q →∗ n.




i ]~C[ ~Q] where
N : τi is σ-open, where Fij ≈ V ji : τi for each i, j, where the Fi and V
j
i
are closed, and where U is a PCF term such that U →∗ dNe. We have
that Si ~FU ~C[~P ] →+d Spushp,q(~C[~P ]; ~F )U ′ where U ′ is a PCF term such
that U ′ →∗ d(N↑p,q)x0p+1 . . . x0qe. Now, defining W
j
i′ as before, we see that
Spushp,q( ~C[~P ]; ~F )U








i′ ] ~C[ ~Q], and
we may apply the induction hypothesis.
Finally, in the third case no hole is in head position in C[ ] and the
proof again proceeds according to the form of C[ ]; the details are omitted.
2
The proof of Theorem 3 is complete.
5 Remarks and Open Problems
We conclude by drawing together some miscellaneous observations and sug-
gesting some directions for further research.
It is easy to show using Proposition 5 that standard LFA interpretations
for each of our languages L do in fact exist. Specifically, let CL be the “syn-
tactic category” whose objects are environments Γ, and whose morphisms
from Γ to ∆ are appropriate tuples of terms in environment Γ modulo obser-
vational equivalence. Then the canonical standard interpretation IL of L in
CL is clearly EFA and universal, and thus LFA. In fact IL is essentially the
only “sensible” LFA interpretation for L. For suppose that I is a standard
and cartesian-closed LFA interpretation of L in D. Then, by Theorem 3 and
a previous remark, it is EFA and universal in the strong sense. It follows
that the full subcategory of D consisting of the objects I[[σ ]] is equivalent
to CL, and then that IL and I are identical, modulo the equivalence.
Given that standard LFA interpretations exist, one can prove, using an
appropriate form of the Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, that non-
standard (and thus non-universal) LFA interpretations also exist. This
shows that the standardness condition in Theorem 3 is indeed necessary.
The syntactic interpretations CL assure us of the existence of LFA inter-
pretations, but these interpretations may not be very useful since questions
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about CL are no easier than questions about L itself. It is more interesting
to ask whether one can give more “semantic” constructions of LFA inter-
pretations. Note that since any standard LFA interpretation is universal it
must have some notion of “computability” built in; the classical category
of cpos does not provide an LFA interpretation for PCF++, for instance,
because of the existence of non-computable elements (this observation is
sharpened in Proposition 12 below). For PCF++, there are several natural
examples of LFA interpretations: the category of effective Scott domains [14]
and many realizability interpretations [11] provide instances. Examples of
LFA interpretations for sequential PCF are given by the recursive versions
of categories of games [1, 8]. Note in passing that the evident r.e. sub-
interpretation of Milner’s EFA interpretation for PCF [12] does not provide
an LFA interpretation, as there exist first-order functions that are effective
and sequential but not PCF-definable (see e.g., [19]). We do not know of
any natural LFA interpretations for PCF+.
Although in this paper we have concentrated mainly on LFA interpreta-
tions for the whole of JL, it is also natural to consider logical full abstrac-
tion for fragments of the language. One way to obtain such a fragment is
to restrict attention to sentences of a certain logical complexity, e.g., the
Πn-sentences, for some n. (Note that, by a previous remark, logical full
abstraction for Πn-sentences and Σn-sentences are equivalent.) Our proof of
Theorem 3 shows that if a standard interpretation is LFA for Π2-sentences
then it is LFA for the whole of JL. In fact, the proof shows more, that it
suffices to be LFA for Π2-sentences with equational matrix, that is, of the
form ∀xσ.∃yτ .M = N—one can even take τ to be ι.
The next result shows that logical full abstraction for Σ1-sentences with
equational matrix is already stronger than equational full abstraction (for
any of PCF+, PCF+ or PCF++).
Proposition 12 Neither Milner’s EFA interpretation for PCF, nor the
standard cpo interpretation, whether taken for PCF+ or PCF++, are LFA
for sentences of the form ∃f ι→ι.M = N .
Proof Let K denote Kleene’s singular tree (see [2, Chapter IV])—recall
that K is a recursive prefix-closed set of finite binary sequences such that K
contains arbitrarily long finite sequences but no recursive infinite path. Let
d−e be an effective coding of finite binary sequences as natural numbers,
and let T : ι → ι be such that T dse →+ 0 iff s ∈ K. We also require a term
P : ι → ι → ι such that P dsedte →+ 0 iff s is a proper prefix of t, and a
term Z : ι → ι → ι such that Z m n →+ 0 iff m = n = 0. Now consider the
sentence
∃f ι→ι. (λxι. Z (T (fx)) (P (fx)(f(succ x)))) = (λxι. cond x 0 0).
It is easy to see that this sentence is denotationally true in all the inter-
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pretations since by König’s Lemma there exists an infinite path through
K, but not operationally true as there is no recursive such path (Milner’s
interpretation coincides with the cpo interpretation at type ι → ι). 2
The (open) problem is now to distinguish LFA for Π1-sentences from LFA.
Another way to obtain fragments of JL is via a notion of type complexity.
The level of a type is defined recursively:
level(ι) = 0; level(σ → τ) = max(level(σ) + 1, level(τ)).
The level of a formula is then taken to be the maximum of the levels of its
quantified variables. (One could also consider stronger alternative defini-
tions placing restrictions on the level of subexpressions.) A standard EFA
interpretation is (evidently) logically fully abstract for sentences of level 0.
For PCF++ one can say more, but first we need a lemma. A type σ is said
to be an L-retract of a type τ if there are closed L-terms Lστ : σ → τ and
Rτσ :τ → σ such that λxσ.Rτσ(Lστ (x)) ≈ λxσ.x holds in L.
Lemma 13 Every type is a PCF++-retract of ι → ι.
Proof We use the “effective universality” remarked in [15], that every effec-
tively given coherent ω-continuous cpo is a computable retract of Tω. In the
interpretation C of PCF++ provided by the classical category of cpos, every
C[[σ ]] is such a cpo; further Tω is a computable retract of the cpo C[[ ι → ι ]].
Since any computable element of any C[[ τ ]] is PCF++-definable [14] we there-
fore have PCF++-terms defining the retracts. The conclusion follows, as the
classical interpretation is EFA for PCF++. 2
With this we can see that a standard interpretation I of PCF++ is LFA iff
it is for sentences of the form ∀f ι→ι.∃mι.M = N . Any such interpretation
must be EFA. But now we can apply the above remarks on LFA for Π2-
sentences, as:
|=I ∀xσ.∃mι.M = N iff |=I ∀f ι→ι.∃mι.M [Rι→ισ f/x] = N [Rι→ισ f/x].
It is an open question as to whether PCF or PCF+ permit any such reduc-
tion in type complexity. It would also be interesting to understand which
retractions hold for these languages.
The results in this paper should apply not just to the languages we have
considered but to a wider class. As regards functional languages, one would
certainly wish to consider the lazy and call-by-value variants of PCF [6, 11].
A further useful extension would be to recursively typed languages, such as
FPC [6, 4]. It would then be natural to consider polymorphic extensions
of PCF; this seems not to be a straightforward matter. It would be also
interesting to formulate an appropriate notion that would allow our results
to be presented at their natural level of generality. This should at least
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include suitable extensions of PCF (in which regard see [9]), and perhaps a
greater degree of abstraction is obtainable.
Finally, we have said very little about axioms and inference rules for
JL. It would be useful to work out the details of an axiomatization for
our logics and show that our axioms were valid in some LFA interpreta-
tion. This would establish that they were also valid under the operational
interpretation—thus we would obtain an attractive program logic. It seems
that the appropriate axioms would be very similar to those of LCF, with
a few additional “effectivity” principles. Of course, in this simple situation
one can imagine that the validity of the axioms could be proved just as
easily by syntactic methods, without the aid of a denotational interpreta-
tion. It would therefore be interesting to carry out a similar programme for
more complex programming languages—it seems plausible that here seman-
tic methods might show a distinct advantage over syntactic ones.
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Programming, Birkhäuser, Boston, 1993.
[4] M. Fiore and G. D. Plotkin, An Axiomatisation of Computationally Adequate
Domain Theoretic Models of FPC, in Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on
Logic in Computer Science, Paris, pp. 92 –102. Washington, IEEE Computer
Society Press,1994.
[5] M. Gordon, R. Milner and C. Wadsworth, Edinburgh LCF, LNCS 78, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, 1978.
[6] C. A. Gunter, Semantics of Programming Languages, MIT Press, Cambridge,
1992.
[7] J. M. E. Hyland, First Steps in Synthetic Domain Theory, in Category Theory,
Proceedings, Como 1990, eds. A. Carboni, M. C. Pedicchio and G. Rosolini,
LNM 1488, pp. 131–157, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1990.
19
[8] J. M. E. Hyland and C.-H. L. Ong, Pi-calculus, Dialogue Games and PCF,
in Proc. 7th ACM Conf. Functional Programming and Computer Architecture,
ACM Press, 1995; see also On Full Abstraction for PCF: I, II and III, by the
same authors, to appear.
[9] T. Jim and A. R. Meyer, Full Abstraction and the Context Lemma (Preliminary
Report), in Proceedings of TACS ’91, eds. T. Ito and A. R. Meyer LNCS 526,
pp. 131–151, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991.
[10] J. Lambek and P. J. Scott, Introduction to Higher-Order Categorical Logic,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
[11] J. R. Longley, Realizability Toposes and Language Semantics, Ph.D. the-
sis, University of Edinburgh, LFCS technical report number ECS-LFCS-95-332,
1995.
[12] R. Milner, Fully Abstract Models of Typed λ-calculi, Theoretical Comp. Sci.,
Vol.4, pp. 1–22, 1977.
[13] P. W. O’Hearn and J. G. Riecke, Kripke Logical Relations and PCF, Invited
Lecture: Workshop on Logic Domains and Programming Languages, Darm-
stadt, 1995, to appear in Information and Computation.
[14] G. Plotkin, LCF Considered as a Programming Language, Theoretical Comp.
Sci., Vol. 5, pp. 223–255, 1977.
[15] G. Plotkin, Tω as a Universal Domain, JCSS, Vol. 17, pp. 209–236, 1978.
[16] D. Scott, Outline of a Mathematical Theory of Computation, in Proc. 4th
Annual Princeton Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, pp. 169–
176, Princeton University, 1970.
[17] D. Scott and C. Strachey Towards a Mathematical Semantics for Computer
Languages, in Proc. Symp. on Computers and Automata, Microwave Research
Institute Symposia Series, Vol. 21, pp. 19–46, Polytechnic Press, Brooklyn, New
York, 1971.
[18] A. Stoughton, Interdefinability of Parallel Operations in PCF, Theoretical
Comp. Sci., Vol. 79, pp. 357–358, 1991.
[19] M. B. Trakhtenbrot, On Representation of Sequential and Parallel Functions,
in Proc. 4th Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science,
LNCS 32, pp. 411–417, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1975.
20
